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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE
STATE OF UTAH

ARTHUR L. MURRAY,
Plaintiff and
Appellant,

vs.
OGDEN CITY, a Municipal
Corporation, and THE
STANDARD CORPORATION,
a Utah Corporation,

Case No. 14249

Defendants and
Respondents.

BRIEF OF RESPONDENT
STANDARD CORPORATION
STATEMENT OF KIND OF CASE
This is an action for personal injuries sustained
by Appellant when a manhole cover moved when he stepped on
it, allowing him to fall into an abandoned water meter manhole
while walking along an Ogden City sidewalk.

Appellant sued

both Ogden City and the abutting property owner, Standard
Corporation.
DISPOSITION IN LOWER COURT
Both Respondents, Ogden City and Standard Corporation,
made Motions for Summary Judgment, which were granted by the
Lower Court.
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL
Respondent Standard Corporation requests this Court
to affirm the Summary Judgment rendered by the Lower Court
in its favor.
STATEMENT OF FACTS
On or about December 7, 1973, Appellant was
walking west on 23rd Street in Ogden, Utah, along the public
sidewalk, when he stepped upon a manhole cover which moved
in such a manner as to allow him to fall into the manhole.
(Dep. 10, 16)

The said manhole was vacant inasmuch as the

water meter and water service had been moved by Ogden City
several years prior to the accident.

(R 28-29; Dep. 18, 52)

The manhole cover was observed by the Appellant
prior to his stepping upon it, and it appeared normal and
flush with the surface of the sidewalk.

(Dep. 15-18)

Appellant has no knowledge of any defect in the
manhole cover or ring.

(Dep. 39, 51)

,
j
I

The manhole cover and ring were inspected immediately i
after the accident by employees of Ogden City, and no defects
of any kind were observed.

(R 50)

When the manhole cover was placed back into the
ring over the hole immediately after the accident, it fit
properly and snugly.

(R 50, 51 and 52)
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Ogden City employees, after replacing the manhole
cover into the ring over the hole, physically attempted to
loosen the cover by jumping upon it, but were unable to dislodge it.

(R 52)
Ogden City had no knowledge of any dangerous con-

ditions regarding said cover or ring prior to the accident
in question.

(R 50, 52, 53, and 54)

Respondent Standard Corporation owns and occupies
the premises which abut the sidewalk where the accident occurred.
(R 5)
Respondent Standard Corporation had no notice or
knowledge of any dangerous condition of the said manhole
cover prior to or at the time of the accident in question.
(R 44-45)
The Standard Corporation at one time had received
its water through a meter situated in the said manhole; however,
in 1968, Ogden City moved the said water meter from 23rd Street
to another street.

Since that time, the subject manhole did

not contain a water meter, nor did it supply water to Standard Corporation.

(R 28-29)

Summary judgment was granted to both Respondents
upon the grounds that as a matter of law, the uncontroverted
evidence clearly showed that the manhole cover and ring were
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not defective, and, furthermore, that neither Respondent
had notice of the loose or otherwise dangerous condition of
the said manhole cover prior to or at the time of the accident,
and that there is no evidence as to how the manhole cover
became loose or for how long the said manhole cover was loose
before the accident*
ARGUMENT
POINT I
RESPONDENT STANDARD CORPORATION, AS A MATTER OF
LAW, WAS NOT NEGLIGENT, AND THERE ARE NO GENUINE ISSUES OF
FACT REMAINING TO BE TRIED.
The Summary Judgment which was granted Standard
Corporation by the Trial Court was granted upon the ground
that regardless of whether or not Standard Corporation, as
abutting owner, had any legal responsibility for the manhole
in question, the evidence clearly indicates that the said
manhole cover was not defective, and that Standard Corporation
had no notice of the manhole cover being loose or otherwise
dangerous.
The evidence is clear that the manhole cover and
ring were not defective at the time of the accident.

The

affidavits of the employees of Ogden City testify that the
manhole cover and ring were free of defect upon immediate

-4-
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inspection after the accident, and that, in fact, the cover
was replaced in the ring over the hole and tests applied as
to jumping and attempting to move the ring out of the hole,
all unsuccessfully.

Furthermore, the Appellant, himself,

testified in his deposition that he knew of no defects in
the cover and the ring.
Therefore, the only remaining possibility to
explain the accident would be for the cover to have been
partially out of its normal place within the manhole cover
ring.

This could have happened at any time, and could have

been caused by any person.

It may have been moved out of

place by a youngster, or teenager, or mischievous vandal
within seconds or minutes prior to the Appellant's approach
and accident.

It is simply unknown who loosened the cover

from its ring or how long it was in that condition prior to
the accident.
As the uncontroverted affidavit of William
Glasmann of Standard Corporation testifies, the said Respondent had no notice or information of any kind regarding a
defective or dangerous condition in regard to this manhole
cover prior to the accident.
There are no remaining facts at issue.

Based upon

these facts, Standard Corporation was entitled to a Summary
Judgment.
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
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In Tripp v. Granite Holding Co., 22 Utah 2d 175,
450 P.2d 99 (1969) a plaintiff was injured in a fall due to
a defective public sidewalk.

The plaintiff sued the abutting

owner and the trial court granted a summary judgment in
favor of the abutting owner and stated, quoting from an
earlier Utah case:
There exists no obligation on the part of an
abutter to keep the sidewalk adjoining his
premises un repair, nor is he liable for any
state of disrepair. His obligation can only
arise where he creates through use or otherwise some unsafe or dangerous condition.
In our case, there was no defect, but only a
dangerous condition of a temporary nature.

In such cases,

the Utah Supreme Court has held that in order to hold an
owner or other responsible party liable for a temporary
condition, such person must have knowledge of the dangerous
condition, or the dangerous condition must exist for such
length of time that such person, by reasonable inspection,
should have discovered it.
In Howard v. Auerbach Co., 20 Utah 2d 355, 437
P.2d 895, a customer slipped on some oil on the escalator in
the store and fell, injuring herself.

Summary judgment in

favor of Auerbachs was affirmed by the Utah Supreme Court,
which stated:
• . . the record is devoid of any indication
who put any oil on the steps of the escalator
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or, if so, it was for such a time that the
store people reasonably could have discovered
and removed it.
The court further stated that the Auerbach case
fell directly within the law enunciated in Koer v. Mayfair
Markets, 19 Utah 2d 339, 431 P.2d 566, where a customer slipped
and fell on a grape on the floor of the store.

The customer

alleged that the store manager had passed by the spot where
the accident occurred just prior to the accident and, therefore,
either had actual knowledge or constructive notice of the
presence of the substance on the floor and should have removed
it#

The trial court granted a judgment notwithstanding the

verdict, which was affirmed by the Utah Supreme Court. The
Supreme Court stated:
We concede that the grape on the floor was a
dangerous condition and that the plaintiff
slipped and fell by reason of such condition.
But we are not able from the evidence to find
any support for the further and necessary inference that this condition was caused by an act
of the defendant, or that the defendant had
actual or constructive knowledge of it. We
just cannot ignore the fact that the grape
was only seen after the fall occurred. From
these circumstances alone a jury could not
be justified in inferring that the grape had
been there for such a period of time that, had
the defendant exercised reasonable care, he
should have known of its presence. Furthermore,
there was testimony at trial that others were
shopping in the aisle. It is quite possible
that one of them dropped the grape on the floor
after the manager passed by. There may have
been any number of reasons, including legitimate
pre-occupation with other problems than whether
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

there was a grape on the floor, or that other
shoppers may have blocked his view, as to
why the manager did not see it. It seems
unfair to permit even a jury with its admittedly
broad prerogatives, to conclude on the one
hand that it was the manager's duty and that
he must have seen it, but on the other, that
it was not the plaintiff's duty and she was
excused from doing so.
The Court in the Koer case recognized and followed
the rule set down in Lindsay v. Eccles Hotel Company, 3 Utah 2d
364, 284 P.2d 477.

In that case, a coffee shop patron

slipped on water and fell.

The Supreme Court held that the

coffee shop owner would not be liable to a patron in absence
of showing how or when water got on to the floor or that the
owner had knowledge of its presence.

The Court stated:

. . . although the evidence indicated that a
waitress delivered water in glasses to plaintiff
and her companion, there is no evidence as to
whether the waitress, the plaintiff, her companion, other patrons or persons spilled the
water on the floor, or exactly when it was
spilled, or whether the management knew of
its existence. In other words, there was no
evidence as to how the water got on the floor,
by whom it was deposited, exactly when it
arrived there or that the defendant had knowledge
of its presence. Under such circumstances, a
jury cannot be permitted to speculate that the
defendant was negligent.
In Long v. Smith Food King Store,

Utah 2d

, 531 P.2d 350, an action brought by a store customer
against the store for injuries he received when he slipped
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and fell upon substance upon the floor, the Utah Supreme
Court affirmed the summary judgment in behalf of the store,
based upon the above cases.

Referring to the above cases,

the Court stated:
The soundness of the basic rules reflected in
those cases is not questioned here: that in
order to impose liability for an injury resulting
from some foreign substance or defective condition, it must have existed for some time and
manner that in due care the defendant either knew
or should have known, and remedied it; and the
variance thereof, that if the condition or
defect was created by the defendant himself
or his agents or employees, the notice requirement does not apply.
The latest statement of the Court came in Allen v.
Federated Dairy Farms, Inc., _ _ _ Utah 2d

_ , 538 P. 2d

175, where a customer slipped and fell in a store on cottage
cheese.

In reply to the appellant's plea for more liberal

law in this area, the Utah Supreme Court stated:
. . . the correct policy is to accord fair
and even handed justice to both by assuring
to each the remedies and protections that the
established rules of law give him; and when
loss or injury occurs, let it rest where it
falls, unless it is affirmatively shown that
another was at fault; and that that was the
cause of the injury.
In the case at bar, the Appellant saw the manhole
cover before stepping upon it, and it appeared normal to him.
However, when he stepped upon it, it tipped or slipped away,
causing him to fall.

Of all persons who were in the best

Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
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position at that time to know of the condition of the manhole
cover, it was the Appellant himself.
The Appellant saw no defects in the cover or the
ring.

There is no evidence of how or why the cover was out

of its normal position.

There is no evidence of how long

the cover was out of its normal position.

The cover may

well have been tipped out of its position by any stranger,
moments before the accident.
The evidence is clear that by the inspection of
Ogden City employees the cover and ring were not defective
or damaged in any way.

The cover was placed back into its

position and found to be normal and safe.

The cover could

not be jarred out of that position by the jumping tests
and other tests applied by Ogden City employees.

And, Ogden

City employees had no knowledge, prior to the accident, of
a dangerous condition involving this manhole cover.
Respondent Standard Corporation, the abutting landowner, had no knowledge of any dangerous condition or problem
with this manhole cover prior to the accident in question.
It is respectfully submitted that there is no
evidence of negligence on the part of Respondent Standard
Corporation, and that the Trial Court's decision granting a
Summary Judgment to Standard Corporation should be affirmed.

-10-
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POINT II.
THE GRANTING OF A MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT WAS
PROPER IN THIS CASE.
Standard Corporation's Motion for Summary Judgment
was timely.

It was filed, with supporting affidavits, on

July 14, 1975.

It was properly noticed up and heard by the

Trial Court on August 5, 1975, less than five weeks away
from trial.
The affidavits of William Glasmann of Standard
Corporation, as well as the affidavits of the employees of
Ogden City, clearly showed that the cover and ring were not
defective at the time of the accident, and that the Standard
Corporation had no notice, whatsoever, prior to or at the time
of the accident, of the manhole cover being out of its normal
position, or any other dangerous condition.
The Appellant failed to adequately counter the
affidavits filed by both Respondents.
At the hearing on both Respondents1 Motions for
Summary Judgment, the Trial Court heard extensive arguments
of all counsel, which, unfortunately, were not recorded.
The Trial Court also had before it supporting affidavits filed
by Standard Corporation and Ogden City, as well as objections
and affidavits which were submitted to the Court at the time
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of the hearing but not filed until afterward.

Based upon

the oral arguments of all counsel, and considering all
affidavits and objections filed by all parties, the Court
granted both Respondents' Motions for Summary Judgment.
Appellant contends that he has been deprived of
an opportunity to show issues of fact because he has not had
an opportunity to complete his discovery in this case. However, the completion of discovery is not the criteria as to
whether or not a Summary Judgment should be granted.

To

allow otherwise, any party to any lawsuit could always raise
the question of discovery in avoidance of Motions for Summary
Judgment.
Rule 56 of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure
provides specifically that a defendant party "may, at any
time, move with or without supporting affidavits for summary
judgment in his favor as to all or any part thereof."

(Rule

56, Utah Rules of Civil Procedure.)
In the case at bar, the Motions for Summary Judgment
were heard on August 5, 1975, more than fifteen months after
the complaint was filed, and merely five weeks away from
trial.

Appellant had more than ample time in which to

institute discovery proceedings.

Nothing was done in this

regard until after the hearing.

-12Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
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It should be pointed out, in fairness, that
Appellant did file and serve upon Standard Corporation interrogatories on December 27, 1974. These interrogatories were
inadvertently misplaced and overlooked.

However, these inter-

rogatories are completely immaterial in this matter, inasmuch
as each and every question asked in those particular interrogatories has been fully answered or admitted to in Standard
Corporation's answer to the complaint or the affidavit of
William Glasmann.

Specifically, we point out these answers

as follows:
1.

Interrogatories number 1, 2, and 3 inquired as

to who was the owner or lessor of the property abutting the
sidewalk in question.

Standard Corporation in its answer to

the complaint admitted that it was the owner of the property
in question.
2*

(R 5-6)
Interrogatory number 4 inquired as to the

legal duty for maintaining the said meter box and cover.
This interrogatory is improper in that it calls for a legal
conclusion.

In any case, it was answered in Standard Cor-

proation's answer to the complaint wherein Standard Corporation
denied responsibility for the sidewalk and affirmatively
alleged that it was a public sidewalk and was owned and
maintained by Ogden City.
3.

(R 5-6)

Interrogatories number 5 and 6 inquired as to
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knowledge by Standard Corporation of negligent maintenance
and conduct to maintain the meter box and cover in question.
These interrogatories were answered by Standard Corporation
in its answer to the complaint and in the affidavit of
William Glasmann, and in Standard Corporation's answer to
the crossclaim filed by Ogden City against it.

(R 5-6,

44-45)
But even more important is the fact that after the
said interrogatories were served by the Appellant upon Standard
Corporation on December 27, 1974, the Appellant filed with
the Court a Notice of Readiness for Trial, properly signed,
which certified "that such use of the rules of discovery
as counsel feels necessary for the trial of this cause has
been completed, and that the case is at issue."

(R 32)

It should be further noted that the Appellant, at
no time, inquired of Standard Corporation for answers to these
interrogatories, nor did the Appellant utilize Rule 37 of
the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, which provides for the
proper procedure in compelling discovery when necessary.

The

said rule provides that where interrogatories have not been
answered, that the discovering party Mmay move for an order
compelling an answer . . ."
Furthermore, at the pretrial conference on May 20,
-14-
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1975, Appellant made no mention of the said interrogatories,
nor did he at the hearing on the Motion for Summary Judgment
itself.
Inasmuch as the questions asked within the said
interrogatories have already been admitted to or answered in
the answer of Standard Corporation or the affidavit of its
Vice President, and the Appellant, after having served the
said interrogatories, certified to the Court that discovery
had been completed and the case was at issue, and since the
Appellant did not compel answers to interrogatories or even
informally request answers to the same at the pretrial conference, the hearing on the Motions for Summary Judgment, or
at any other time, Appellant should not now be allowed to
raise this question in hopes of setting aside the Summary
Judgment on a mere legal technicality.
CONCLUSION
Respondent Standard Corporation respectfully
submits that the Summary Judgment granted in its favor by
the Trial Court should be affirmed.

The evidence is clear

that the said manhole cover and ring were not defective
in any way, and that Standard Corporation had no notice of
any kind that the manhole cover was out of its proper

-15-
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position prior to or at the time the Appellant stepped upon
it.

Regardless of whether or not Standard Corporation, the

abutting owner, had a responsibility for this abandoned
manhole cover and ring, the fact remains that Stnadard Corporation had no prior notice of any problem with this manhole
cover.

To submit this case to a jury would compel a jury

to base its decision upon pure speculation.

Standard Cor-

poration respectfully submits that its Summary Judgment should
be affirmed.
Respectfully submi

rSfjjm&Apt
vufiONARD H. RUSSON
HANSON, WADSWORTH § RU\S0N
70£ Kearns Buildin o
Salt Lake City, Utah 84101
Attorney for Respondent
Standard Corporation
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Lake City, Utah 84101, on this

Q?£'^day

of December, 1975.
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